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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
MATTHEW CAMPBELL, and SCM02,
INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

v.
ALAN HENDRY,
Defendants.

Civil Action File No. 2016-CV-273157

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF MATTHEW CAMPBELL'S MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Matthew Campbell's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement.

Upon consideration

of the briefs submitted on the Motion and

relevant case and statutory law on the matter, this Court finds as follows:
Plaintiff Matthew Campbell ("Campbell")

and Defendant Alan Hendry ("Hendry")

each own 50% of Plaintiff SCM02, Inc. ("SCM02"),
for over thirteen years.
environment,
Hendry's

a company they operated together

Unable to continue working together in a deadlocked

Campbell and Hendry began negotiations

ownership interest in SCM02 in May 2015.

but also demanded

for Campbell to buyout
Hendry accepted this first offer

certain tax treatment of the sale which was essential to his

acceptance of the offer. Campbell backed out of the deal, initiating efforts to go through
mediation.

The three day mediation ultimately failed but brought the parties closer to

resolution.

Based on their discussions

Memorandum of Understanding

("MOU")

at mediation,

Campbell presented to Hendry a

dated February 22, 2016 and identified as an
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"offer to purchase SCM02 shares."

Campbell's email transmitting the MOU set an

acceptance deadline of February 24, 2016.
On February 29,2016,

past the expiration

of the offer, Hendry emailed Campbell

stating: "I agree to your offer to purchase my shares at the price offered according to the
attached."

In response, Campbell sent an email on March 2,2016,

terms Hendry sent, but adding "clarifications" to six provisions

agreeing to the

listed in the new MOU.

While the MOU provided that Campbell's shares would be transferred to Hendry upon
payment in full, Hendry's clarification provided that Campbell's shares would be held in
trust until payment in full.

Also, while the MOU provided that the purchase price would

be based on retained earnings (estimated to be $535,000)
of February 29,2016

(estimated as $601,000),

would be paid from SCM02 as "ordinary
particular

and accounts receivable as

Hendry clarified the accounts receivable

income (1099)."

Campbell asserts that this

revision will cause him to accrue a tax liability of $166,000.

Hendry asserts he believed

these clarifications

were a counteroffer,

In his affidavit,
not an acceptance

of his offer. His affidavit also asserts that he emailed Campbell on March 9, 2016 to
inform him the revisions were unacceptable-he

intended to retain his shares until

payment in full and would not agree to the increased tax liability-though

this email is

not before the Court. Campbell tendered payment to Hendry on March 31,2016
amount of $268,412.13,

in the

which he stated was 50% of the taxed retained earnings due

under the March 2,2016 agreement.

Based on the foregoing,

the key issue is whether

1 Both parties attach this email as an exhibit to their briefs. Campbell's version does not
contain a copy of the MOU. Presumably, the copy of the MOU attached as an exhibit to
Hendry's brief in opposition to the Motion contains Hendry's changes to the original
MOU sent by Campbell. Either way, it seems as if both parties are considering
Hendry's response as a counteroffer and the operative offer at issue in this Motion.

2

the parties formed a valid contract on March 2,2016,

that is enforceable as a matter of

law.
Hendry argues Campbell's characterization
"settlement
action.

of the purported agreement as a

agreement" is inaccurate as the purported agreement pre-dated any legal

Regardless, a motion to enforce a settlement

issues raised in a motion for summary judgment,

agreement is analogous to the

requiring

uncontested factual evidence

indicating there is not a question of material fact. DeRossett Enters, Inc. v. General

Elec. Capital Corp., 275 Ga. App. 728, 728 (2005). The evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. To succeed, the movant must "show the
court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal
that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential
element." Id. (quoting Superglass Windshield Repair v. Mitchell, 233 Ga. App. 200
(1998)).
Likewise, a settlement agreement is a contract and must meet the same statutory
requirements for contract formation and meeting of the minds. Id. at 729. To constitute
a valid contract, there must be assent of the parties to the terms of the contract-a
meeting of the minds on the essential terms. O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1; Great West Casualty
Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 28 (2010). All material terms must be agreed upon
at the time of formation or no meeting of the minds will exist. Jerry Dickerson Presents,
Inc. v. Concert S Chastain Promotions, 260 Ga. App. 316, 328 (2003); see also
O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2 ("until each [party] has assented to all the terms, there is no binding
contract; until assented to, each party may withdraw his bid or proposition.").
"Acceptance of an offer must be unconditional, unequivocal, and without variance of any
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sort, otherwise, there can be no meeting of the minds and mutual assent necessary to
formation of a contract."

Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 645-46 (1988). "The

subsequent communication by one party to the contract to the other party 'varying only
one term of the original offer' is a counteroffer." Id. (quoting Stubbs v. Tattnall Bank,
244 Ga. 212, 213 (1979)).
Whether a contract exists at all is a matter of fact. McKenna v. Capital Resource
Partners, IV, LP, 286 Ga. App. 828, 832 (2007). When reviewing whether a contract

was formed, the Court applies an objective theory of intent to determine whether the
party knew he or she was agreeing the terms based on the surrounding circumstances.
Id.

Where extrinsic evidence, such as correspondence and discussion is disputed, the

question of whether a party has assented to the contract is generally a matter for the
jury. Id.
Here, Hendry has presented sufficient evidence in opposition to this Motion to
demonstrate there was no meeting of the minds on at least two material termswhether Hendry would receive 50% of pre- or post-tax accounts receivable in exchange
for his ownership interest in SCM02 and whether he would maintain his ownership
interest until such time as he received full payment for that interest. Campbell's email
on March 2, 2016 did not unconditionally accept Hendry's revised MOU. Instead
Campbell added six "clarifications" and Hendry has presented evidence that at least two
of these clarifications altered material terms of the offer. By changing the terms of the
MOU, Campbell's March 2 email was a counteroffer, not a meeting of minds sufficient to
form an enforceable contract. As such, Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement is DENIED.
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50 ORDERED this ~

day of June, 2016.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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